India Prepared for Round II; Pakistan Pleads for US Intervention on May 10

Despite Western media efforts to portray India and Pakistan as military equals, Islamabad explicitly sought U.S. intervention after New Delhi launched missile strikes on the Nur Khan air base deep inside Pakistan on the morning of May 10, coinciding with an impending Indian Navy assault on Karachi’s naval port.

The Modi administration’s decision to avoid further escalation following the Rawalpindi strike stemmed from a clear assessment: Pakistan simply cannot match India’s military strength.

This satellite image provided by Maxar Technologies shows Nur Khan Air Base with damaged buildings after a strike during hostilities with India in Rawalpindi.(AP)

Pakistan’s submission was evident in the urgent attempts by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to contact his Indian counterparts, S. Jaishankar and Ajit Doval, on the morning of May 10.

While Indian missiles severely damaged the Nur Khan air base early that day, Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), Kashif Abdullah, reached out to his Indian counterpart at 10:38 a.m., warning of intelligence suggesting an imminent BrahMos missile attack on Karachi’s naval facilities. Although the Pakistani DGMO threatened retaliation, India remained calm and fully prepared for any escalation.

When Secretary Rubio conveyed Pakistan’s readiness to agree to a ceasefire, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar responded firmly but courteously that any such proposals must come through military channels, as operations were being led by the armed forces. Meanwhile, India disregarded appeals from Pakistan’s Foreign Minister and its usual allies calling for a halt to hostilities.

Several Western narratives, including those from French state media, sought to exaggerate the superiority of Chinese weaponry over India’s arsenal. In reality, the Modi government was prepared to escalate fully if Pakistan chose to do so. India faced no pressure to de-escalate, particularly since Pakistan had lost nearly all viable military targets east of the Indus following the destruction of 11 air bases and the neutralization of its air defenses. India deliberately refrained from striking Balochistan or the Pashtun-majority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In fact, India’s operation—aimed at dismantling terror infrastructure inside Pakistan—was completed within 25 minutes on the morning of May 7.

Notably, despite French media’s attempt to downplay the performance of Indian Rafale fighters, Indian aerial platforms, missiles, loitering munitions, and drones effectively overwhelmed Pakistani forces. Following the May 10 missile strike, India retained the ability to target any location within Pakistan, as Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defense systems had been largely destroyed or jammed.

India chose to halt further hostilities based on a strategic judgment: since mission goals were achieved, continuing the conflict would only enable Pakistan to portray itself as the victim to Western and Chinese audiences. Simply put, India and Pakistan are not military equals, and New Delhi had no interest in prolonging a conflict after neutralizing Pakistan’s ability to retaliate.

Given the advisory role played by Chinese and Turkish personnel in Pakistan’s air warfare strategy, India is expected to take countermeasures against all parties that supported terrorist elements after the Pahalgam massacre. The Modi government is increasingly prioritizing stand-off weapons, recognizing that conventional land battles are becoming obsolete. With the planned induction of 31 U.S.-made Predator armed drones by 2028, India is also advancing development of high-altitude armed drones and low-cost swarm drones similar to those Turkey supplied to Pakistan along the border.

Pakistan is also expected to face repercussions from India’s upcoming suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty next month. Operation Sindoor has underscored a vital lesson for New Delhi: India must rely on its own comprehensive military capabilities to counter real adversaries in the region—and beyond.

(With inputs from Hindustan Times)